

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 4, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 4, 1998

DNFSB Activity Summary: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh were on site all week. D. Burnfield, J. DeLoach, and OE R. Lewis were on site observing ISMS Verification, C. Martin was on site observing NESS and W56 activity, and OE L. McGrew was on site observing the W62 review.

ISMS Verification Review: The site ISMS Verification Review continued, and has been extended a week. Several problems resulted in confusion and a less than effective review of the Pantex ISMS. First, the review was limited in scope and did not adequately address the ISMS contributions of DOE-AL and the Design Agencies. Second, Verification Team field observations appeared to be focused on “showcase” programs (e.g., W69, W79) as opposed to sampling other programs (e.g., W62). Third, the Verification Team was tasked with performing two additional reviews in parallel (i.e., the annual ES&H and NES assessments). The Verification Team included 36 members, but, as a whole, was not strong. Staff reviews of evaluation forms revealed that some are centered on specific issues, rather than integration of safety management and systems.

W56 SIRR: The W56 Single Integrated Readiness Review (SIRR) began this week. Tooling, bay preparation, combustible loading, and ALARA practices/contamination control had obviously been given significant consideration. However, a significant problem occurred on Wednesday during completion of bay pre-ops. A PT noted that an energy source had not been locked out as required, and was, in fact, overlooked in the NEOP. The Operations Manager (OM) attempted to waive the requirement, but the SIRR Team intervened. The OM did not appear to understand this SS-21 safety criterion, or the significance of the (draft) W56 ABCD and Authorization Basis documents. Subsequent discussion also revealed that the Facility Manager had not been part of the W56 ABCD development process, and had not been issued a copy.

W62 SS-21 Attributes Review: The W62 SS-21 Attributes Review was conducted this week, as part of the corrective actions for the suspended W62 NESS Revalidation. It is not clear that the results of this review (to be released next week) will promote resolution of all of the technical issues associated with this program. Review activities were hindered by differences of opinion between team members, M&H management, and DOE-AL regarding review purpose and scope, and by a significant Design Agency/project team tendency to defend the status quo.

NES Electrical Tester Master Study Part II: The Master Study resumed this week with deliberations on issues noted during the presentations (August 11-21). Approximately 33 discussion points have resulted in 5 potential recommendations, tentatively categorized as post-start concerns. These include: analysis of abnormal environments for MTL equipment; evaluation of maintenance requirements for pink-labeled equipment; compliance with the Explosive Safety Manual; assessment of M&H implementation of DOE Order 452.2A and DOE-AL SD 5610.11A; and upgrading the condition of the Zone 12 metrology facility.